We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with m heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some S,T , (S ∪T ) < (S) + (T )) and complements (i.e., for some S,T , (S ∪ T ) > (S) + (T )). We show that the mechanism rst proposed by Babaio et al. [2014] -the be er of selling the items separately and bundling them together -guarantees a Θ(d) fraction of the optimal revenue, where d is a measure on the degree of complementarity. Note that this is the rst approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer whose valuation exhibits any kind of complementarity. It extends the work of Rubinstein and Weinberg [2015], which proved that the same simple mechanisms achieve a constant factor approximation when buyer valuations are subadditive, the most general class of complement-free valuations.
